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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
KIPP PHILLIPS, DENNIS HORN, 
and JERRY McCRIGHT, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellants appeal from convictions of the crime 
of distributing pornographic material pursant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1204 (Supp. 1973), by the Second Ju-
dicial District Court, Weber County. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Each of the appellants was separately charged and 
found guilty of distributing pornographic material in 
Case No. 
13816 
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Ogden City Court (R-14, 15)*. Thereafter, the cases 
were consolidated on appeal to the Second District Court, 
Weber County, where the sole issue was the constitution-
ality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1204 (Supp, 1973). The 
Court, through the Honorable Calvin Gould, held that 
the section in question was constitutional and that each 
of the appellants was guilty as charged (R-49). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays that the convictions of the lower 
court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellants were convicted of a Class "B" misde-
meanor and sentenced to pay a fine of $299.00 in the 
Ogden City Court for distributing pornographic material, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1204 (Supp. 1973) 
(R-3). Each of the appellants appealed their conviction 
to the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County 
(R-17). Appellants stipulated on said appeal that the 
publications entitled Pole & Hole, Climax and Love 
Thirsty, respectively, were purchased by Ogden City 
police officers from the named appellants at the Adult 
Book and Cinema Store in Ogden (R-143). These publi-
cations are part of the record before this court. Appel-
lants further stipulated that the only issue before the 
*The Record references cited are to the Kipp Phillips file, 
Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, Crim. #10941, 
which is identical for purposes of this appeal to the files of the 
other two appellants. 
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3 
trial court was the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1204 (Supp. 1973) and conceded that if said sec-
tion was held to be constitutional their convictions should 
be affirmed (R-144). 
Appellants (R-51-133; 43-48) and respondent (R-20-
44) having filed memoranda in support of their respective 
positions, the Honorable Calvin Gould held that the stat-
ute was constitutional and each of the appellants guilty 
as charged (R-49). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
OBSCENITY IS NOT SPEECH AND IS NOT 
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT. 
The First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . ." 
Relying upon social and legal history, the United States 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "obscene" speech 
or writing is not protected by the constitutional guaran-
tees of the First Amendment. Roth v. United States, 354 
U. S. 473, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498 (1957); Miller v. California, 
413 U. S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973); and other cases. The 
reasoning of the court in Roth was that because obscenity 
is devoid of any value, it should not be considered speech 
ait all, and thus need not be afforded constitutional pro-
tection. 
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POINT II. 
UTAH'S STATUTE MEETS THE REQUIRE-
MENTS OF THE UNITED STATES SU-
PREME COURT. 
Prior to June, 1973, the leading obscenity decision 
of the United Sta te Supreme Court was Roth v. United 
States 354 U. S. 476 (1957). The Roth Court cited witih 
approval (at p. 487) the definition of obscenity as con-
tained in the American Law Institute Model Penal Code,* 
Thereafter, the drafters of the Utah Penal Code, adopted 
in 1973, attempted, it has been said, to comply with Roth, 
and a later United States Supreme Court decision, A 
Book v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 
413 (1966).** They provided in Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
§ 1203(1) (1973 Supp.) the definition of pornography*** 
as follows: 
"(1) Any material or performance is porno-
graphic if, considered as a whole, applying 
contemporary community standards; 
(a) Its predominant appeal is to prurient in-
terest; and 
(b) I t goes substantially beyond customary 
*ALI, Model Penal Code § 207.10(2) Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957. 
**Loren Dale Martin, Utah Criminal Code Outline, Utah Law 
Law Enforcement Planning Agency (1973), pp 232-234. 
***The terms "obscentity" and "pornography" appear to be 
used interchangeably by the courts, commentators, and legisla-
tures. 
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limits of candor in the description or repre-
sentation of nudity, sex, or excretion." 
This section is the heart of appellants' constitutional 
challenge. 
In June, 1973, the Supreme Court, in a series of 
decisions beginning with Miller v. California, 413 U. S, 
15 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973), formulated "concrete guidelines 
to isolate 'hardcore' pornography from expression pro-
tected by the First Amendment." Id. ai 29. Miller re-
quires that for legislation to constitutionally regulate 
obscenity the legislation must only prohibit works which: 
1. " depict or describe sexual conduct . . . 
specifically defined by the applicable state law, 
as written or authoritatively construed (em-
phasis added)." Id. at 2615. 
2. "taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient 
interest in sex [and] portray sexual conduct in 
a patently offensive way . . ." Id. set 2615. 
3. ". . . and which . . . do not have serious lit-
erary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 
Id. at 2615. 
A. The Utah Statute Defines Prohibited Sexual 
Conduct In Such A Way As To Give "Due 
Process" "Notice. 
The first element of Miller requires that the pro-
scribed sexual conduct be defined, either by statute or 
by judicial construction, with enough specificity to give 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a parson wishing to comply with the law that notice in-
herent in the concept of due process. The degree of 
specificity required was stated in Roth as follows: 
"This court, however, has consistently held a 
lack of precision is not itself offensive to the 
requirements of due process . . . The constitu-
tion does not require impossible standards; 
All that is required is that the language con-
veys sufficiently definite warning as to the 
proscribed conduct when measured by common 
understanding and practices. U.S. v. Petrillo, 
[citation omitted] . . . that there may be marg-
inal cases in which it may be difficult to de-
termine the side of the line on which a partic-
ular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason 
to hold the language too ambiguous to define 
a criminal offense. [8 citations omitted] (Em-
phasis added)" Id. at 1510-1511. 
That part of Utah's ifomiulation of the conduct or exhi-
bitions proscribed in § 76-10-1203(1) which reads: "nud-
ity, sex, or excretion" has never been construed by this 
Court, although it has been upheld against constitutional 
attack by Judges Ziegler and Taylor of the Ogden City 
Court and Judge Gould of the Second District Court in 
the proceedings below. Appellants calls upon this court 
to "authoritatively construe" that language. 
1. It is The Duty Of This Court To Hold An 
Act Of The Legislature Constitutional If It 
Is Possible To Do So. 
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Appellants do not attack the constitutionality of the 
Utah Pornography Statute as applied to the facts of 
their cases but only on its fact. Therefore if any sex or 
nudity conceivably could be constitutionally proscribed 
by this statute, appellants concede they should stand 
convicted. Thus, this court is saved the unpleasant duty 
of examining the three magazines which are a part of 
the record on appeal before it.* 
In a 1973 Utah Supreme Court case, State Board of 
Education v. State Board of Higher Education, 29 Utah 
2d 110, 505 P. 2d 1193, Justice Ellett, concurring, stated: 
"Our duty is to hold an act of the legisla-
ture valid if it is possible to do so [citing Utah 
cases] (emphasis added)." 
In the same case, Justice Crockett, also concurring, 
stated: 
"The presumption of constitutionality 
should be indulged . . . " 
In a case cited by Justice Crockett in support of the 
aforequoted language, Newcomb v. Ogden City Public 
School Teachers Retirement Commission, 112 Utah 503, 
517, 243 P. 2d 941 (1952), Chief Justice Wolfe, speaking 
for the court, stated that the "duty" of the courts was 
* Should the court suspect that counsel for appellants con-
ceded too much in limiting this attack to the facial unconstitu-
tionality of the statute, the court need only examine any one of 
the three magazines to understand counsel's willingness to concede 
their obscentity assuming the statute is valid. 
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to hold legislative acts constitutional unless convinced 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" that they are unconstitu-
tional. And, in Gubler v. Utah State Teachers Retire-
ment Board, 113 Utah 188, 200, 192 P. 2d 580 (1948), 
Justice Latimer stated for the court: 
"Every presumption is in favor of the con-
stitutionality of an act of the legislature . . ." 
It has even been held that a strained constructioti 
is desirable if it is the only construction that will save 
TOnstitutionality. In Warren Sanitary Milk Co. v. Board 
of Review, 179 N. E. 2d 385, 390 (Ct. Com. Pleas., Ohio), 
the court stated: 
". . . a strained construction is not only 
permissible, but desirable, if it is the only con-
struction that will have constitutionality. 
Knights Templar's, etc., Co. v. Jarman, 187 
U.S. 197, 23 S. Ct. 108, 47 L. Ed. 139 [and 
citing other cases]." 
2. Cases Construing Language Similar To Or 
Less Specific Than "Nudity, Sex or Excre-
tion.'9 
In Miller, the Court expressly left it open for state 
courts to add the requisite specificity to state statutes 
by judicial construction where the language of the statute 
itself was arguably not specific enough. In consequence 
of this part of the Miller decision, many state courts 
have already "authoritatively construed" their state stat-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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utes. Likewise, a number of federal courts have "authori-
tatively construed" federal statutes on obscenity. A sur-
vey of these cases in the wake of Miller shows that al-
most all of these sitate and fedaral courts have upheld 
the validity of the legislation they examined. 
a. State Cases. 
On the state level, with the exception of Indiana and 
Louisiana, all state courts have upheld the constitution-
ality of their obscenity statutes against attack that they 
did not specifically define the sexual conduct or exhibi-
tion sought to be prohibited. 
(1) In People v. Hellin, 33 N. Y. 2d 314, 307 N. E. 
2d 805 (1973), the Court upheld statutory language 
which, like Utah's language, proscribed material if "con-
sidered as a whole its predominant appeal is to prurient, 
shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, excretion . . . 
(Emphasis added.)" In language fully applicable to the 
Utah Statute, the court said: 
" I t takes no dictionary reference to understand 
what the words 'nudity', 'sex', 'excretion' . . . 
mean . . . I t is ludicrous and preposterous to 
suppose that a person dealing in such material 
would not understand the prohibitions here 
When sex and nudity, and thg other sorts of 
prohibited conduct for that matter, are ex-
ploited substantially beyond customary limits 
of candor and would, as the average man views 
it, be the predominant element in the material 
so as to appeal, again predominantly, to las-
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civious cravings, then there can be no doubt 
as to what is prohibited. What we are talking 
about is hard-core pornography.... Hard-core 
pornography consists of 'patently offensive 
representations or descriptions of ultimate sex-
ual acts, normal or perverted, actual or sim-
ulated [and/or] patently offensive represen-
tation or descriptions of masturbation, excre-
tionary functions, and lewd exhibition of the 
genitals'." 307 N.E.2d 813 
(2) In People v. Enskat, 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 109 
Cal. Rptr. 433, 438-441 (1973), the California Court of 
Appeals noted that the intent of Miller was to strengthen 
the psrotabition against obscenity, and that to declare 
California's sitatute unconstitutional would run counter 
to this. The Court then construed the California obscen-
ity statute,* containing striking similarities to Utah's, 
in such a way as to meet the Miller test. 
(3) In Price v. Commonwealth, Va , 201 
S. E. 2d 798 (1974), the court held that to proscribe ma-
terial, as does Utah, by reference to "nudity, sex, or 
excretion" satisfied constitutional requirements, stating: 
"We conclude that the Virginia obscenity stat-
* "Ob scene matter means matter, taken as a whole, the pre-
dominant appeal of which to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, is to prurient interet, i.e., a 
shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion; and is 
matter which taken as a whole goes substantially beyond custo-
mary limits of candor in description or representation of such 
matters; and is matter which taken as a whole is utterly without 
redeeming social importance . . . (emphasis added)." California 
Penal Code § 811. 
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lite, as construed, prohibits only hard-core por-
nography such as the examples delineated in 
Miller and does not restrict constitutionally 
protected speech and writing. We do not be-
lieve that the Miller examples were intended to 
preempt or standardize state obscentity stat-
utes, for the Supreme Court emphasized that 
it was not the court's function to propose reg-
ulatory schemes to the states." 201 S.E. 2d 800 
(4) In Shton v. Paris Adult Theater J, 231 Ga. 
312, 201 S. E. 2d 456 (1973), on remand from tihe United 
States Supreme Court, Georgia's highest court held that 
the Georgia obscenity statute, which is similar to the 
Utah definition of obscenity,* was limited to hard-core 
pornography as defined by Miller, and thus was consti-
tutiooal. 
(5) Construing a statute** virtually identical to 
Utah's, Kentucky's highest court held that it met the con-
stitutional standards of Miller in Hall v. Commonwealth 
ex rel. Schroering, Ky , 505 S. W. 2d 166 (1974). 
(6) In State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash. 
2d 584, 512 P. 2d 1049, 1059-1061 (July 27, 1973), the 
* "Matter is obscene if considered as a whole, applying con-
temporary standards, its predominant appeal is to prurient in-
terest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or ex-
cretion . . . . (emphasis added)." Ga. Code Ann. § 26-2101 (b) 
**" 'Obscene' means that to the average person applying con-
temporary standards the predominant appeal of the matter, taken 
as a whole, is prurient interest, a shameful or morbid interest 
in nudity, sex or excretion, which goes substantially beyond custo-
mary limits of candor in description or representation of such 
matters." (emphasis added). K.R.S. § 436-101(1)(c) 
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court upheld a Washington statute which merely used 
the word "obscene" to define the proscribed conduct, 
stating at p. 1060: 
"We hold that the word 'obscene' as used in 
R C W 9.68.010 is not unconstitutionally vague 
when considered in the light of the Roth-Miller 
test. . . . As thus authoritatively construed by 
this court, R C W 9.68.010 is sufficiently defi-
nite, when measured by common understand-
ing and practice (emphasis by the court)." 
The Washington court then pointed to the authoritative 
construction placed by the United States Supreme Court 
in the 12-200-F£. Reels case, infra, in "commenting upon 
a federal statute using many words similar to those in 
RCW 9.68.010." Id., at 1060, note 6. 
(7) In Gibbs v. State, Ark , 504 S. W. 2d 
719 (1974), the defendant contended, as the appellants 
in the case at hand, that Miller required that the depic-
tion of sexual conduct sought to be prohibited must be 
spelled out in the statute itself.* However, the court 
rejected this argument by authoritively construing the 
statute to apply only to materials which depict patently 
offensive "hard-core" sexual conduct. In so doing, it 
stated: 
"Also, we are dedicated to the proposition that 
"'Arkansas' statute provided merely: " 'obscene' means that 
to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the 
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the 
prurient interest/' Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2730. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
we must give an act a construction that would 
meet constitutional tests, if it is reasonably 
possible to so do." 504 S.W. 2d 725 
(8) In Ebert v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 
19 Md. App. 300, 313 A. 2d 536 (1973), the Maryland 
Court upheld a state film licensing arrangement whereby 
a board of censors was mandated to withhold licensing 
from films which are "obscene," construing "obscene" by 
reference to the Miller standards of prurience and patent 
offensiveness. 
(9) In State v. Bryant, 20 N. C. App. 223, 201 
S. E. 2d 211 (1973), the court held that a North Caro-
lina statute proscribing the selling of "any obscene writ-
ing" satisfied Miller after construing that term in light 
of the other elements of the United States Supreme 
Court's constitutional test of obscenity. 
(10) In State, ex rel. Wampler v. Bird, Mo. 
, 499 S. W. 2d 780, 783-784 (1973), the Missouri ob-
scenity statute was upheld notwithstanding it prohibited 
"obscene, lewd and indecent books" without a more 
specific description of the conduct or exhibitions sought 
to be proscribed, the court construing those words in 
light of the prurience and patently offensive elements 
of the Miller test. 
(11) In Rhodes v. State, Fla , 283 So. 2d 351 
(Fla. Sup. Ot. 1973), the court held that the Florida 
statute met constitutional obscenity requirements al-
though its only definition of obscene material is whether 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the dominant theme of that material appeals to the prur-
ient in/barest. 
(12) Finally, the former Texas obscenity statute* 
was upheld in West v. State, 16 Cr. L. Rep. 2121 (Tex. 
Ct. Crim. App. 1974), wherein the Court held that Miller 
authorized the Court to judicially construe the requisite 
specificity needed to satisfy constitutional standards. 
b. Federal cases. 
In United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm 
Film, 413 U. S. 123 (1973), a case decided at the same 
time as Miller, the court ^considered 19 U. S. C. § 1305(a), 
which prohibits the importation of artides which are 
"obscene or immoral," without more specific definition. 
In sustaining the constitutionality of the section, the 
Court through Chief Justice Burger noted that if a "ser-
ious doubt" as to vagueness was raised by the use of the 
words "obscene;," "lewd," "lascivious," "filthy," "inde-
cent," or "immoral" the Court would interpret these terms 
as 'limiting regulated material to patently offensive rep-
resentations or descriptions of that specific 'hard-core' 
sexual conduct given as examples in Miller . . ." Id., 130, 
note 7. See also United States v. One Reel of Film, 481 
F. 2d 206, 209-210 (1st Cir. 1973), also upholding the 
constitutionality of 19 U. S. C. § 1305(a), referred to in 
the 12 200 Ft. Reels case. 
*" 'Obscene' material means material . . . which is patently 
offensive because it affronts community standards relating to the 
description of sexual matters. . . ." Art. 527, Vernon's Texas 
Codes Ann., Penal (repealed January 1, 1974). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
In United States v. Thevis, 484 F. 2d 1149 (5th Cir 
1973), the Fifth Circuit Court, relying on the 12 200 
Ft. Reels case, upheld the ronstitutijonality of 18 U. S. C. 
§ 1462, which defined materials sought to be proscribed 
from interstate commerce in no more specific terms than 
"obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy." 
B. The Utah Statute Meets the Other Ele-
ments of the United States Supreme Court 
Obscenity Test. 
1. "Patently Offensive" Formulation. 
Appellants contend that because Utah Code Ann. 
(1953), § 76-10-1203 (Supp, 1973) fails to use the exact 
language they allege is required to meet minimum ele-
ments of Miller it is consitituitionally infirm. In other 
words, they complain that the drafters of § 76-10-1203(1) 
did not have the prescience to use the same language 
which would appear in Miller six months later. A similar 
attack was made upon Utah's prior obscenity statute in 
Gordon v. Christenson, 317 F. Supp. 146 (D. Utah, 1970) 
and expressly rejected. Chief Judge Lewis spoke for a 
three judge court in Gordon as follows: 
Since the Utah statute does not conform 
exactly with the present tripartite test as enun-
ciated in A Book Named "John Cleland's 
Memoirs of a Woman of Plaesure" v. Attor-
ney General of Com. of Massachusetts, 383 
U.S. 413, the issue is whether a criminal ob-
scenity statute must expressly incorporate all 
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Supreme Court decisions defining obscenity 
in order to be valid. We hold that it need not. 
All that is required is that a statute give ade-
quate notice and warning of what conduct is 
prohibited. The Utah statute accomplishes this 
since it contains the essential ingredients of the 
present constitutional standard for obscenity 
as reflected in judicial interpretations pertain-
ing to creative art. 
Other than giving notice, the inclusion of 
any definition of the word "obscene" within 
the statute is unnecessary. The constitutional 
definition as enunciated by Memoirs and other 
decisions is automatically and impliedly in-
cluded within the Utah statute by way of the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Con-
stitution and the binding effect of Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting that Constitution. 
I t is reasonable to assume that the Utah courts 
will recognize this supremacy and hold or in-
struct a jury in any prosecution under the 
statute according to the obscenity test enun-
ciated in Memoirs,, Similar conclusions have 
been reached in respect to other state stautes 
(emphasis added)." Id. at 148. 
It is noteworthy that appellants cite no authority 
for their bald and unreasonable assedion that Utah's 
statute is constitutionally infirm because it only says 
that to be pornographic, material must "go substantially 
beyond customary limits of candor" instead of saying, 
as does Miller, the material must be "patently offensive." 
Assuming there is a difference between these two foram-
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lations, the Supremacy Clause clearly supplies whatever 
might be absent in Utah's formulation. 
Moreover, quite independent of the effect of the 
Supremacy Clause, this Court has a duty to construe the 
words "go beyond the customary limits of candors "in 
such a way as to avoid unconstitutionality^ if reasonable 
to do so. It is eminently reasonable to construe those 
words to be synonymous with the words "patently offen-
sive." This is precisely what was done by the state courts 
which decided the cases numbered 2 and 4, above. 
2. The Utah Statute Protects Materials Which 
Have "Serious Literary, Artistic, Political 
or Scientific Value" Independent of the 
Supremacy Clause. 
The third element of the test in Miller is apparently 
designed to protect against the prosecution of materials 
which, though dealing with sex, nudity and excretion 
have some serious pedogogical or otherwise justifiable 
purpose. The words used in Miller are "serious literary, 
artistic, political or scienitific value". Utah also provides 
distributors of materials with the same protection, quite 
independent of the Supremacy Clause: 
"The following shall be affirmative defenses to 
prosecution under this chapter: 
That the distribution of pornographic material 
was restricted to institutions or persons having 
scientific, educational, governmental, or other 
similar justification for possessing pornogra-
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phic material: . . . " Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) § 76-10-1208(1) (1973 Supp.). 
Thus, the Utah Statute does precisely what Miller re* 
quires; it protects works of value. 
Appellants may argue that the third element of the 
Miller test was never designed to be an affirmative de-
fense, and that only if the statute requires the prosecu-
tion to prove lack of serious value will it pass constitu-
tional attack. But even assuming, arguendo, this to be 
true, this court is free to hold that the burden of proving 
that a work lacks serious literary, ets. value lies with the 
prosecution, notwithstanding § 76-10-1208(1) is denom-
inated an "affirmaitive defense" by the drafters of the 
statute. Such would be an acceptable "authoritative 
o)n&ti!iction" in pursuance of the court's duty to uphold 
the statute's constitutionality when reasonable to do so. 
Not only does logic thus allow this court to uphold 
the Utah Statute as meeting the third test of Miller, 
quite independent of the Supremacy Clause, but the Ore-
gon Statute, which the court in Miller expressly ap-
proves,* can only pass the third part of the Miller test 
if a court construes the language found in that statute's 
affirmative defenses so as to meet that part of the test. 
Moreover, the language found in Oregon's affirmative 
defenses are not nearly as similar to the wording in Miller 
as that found in § 76-10-1208(1) of the Utah statute; 
those Oregon defenses are: 
*Miller v. California, Id, at 2615, note 6. 
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§ 167.085 "In any prosecution under ORS 
167.065 to 167.080, it is an affirmative defense 
for the defendant to prove: 
(1) That the defendant was in a parental or 
guardianship relationship with the minor; or 
(2) That the defendant was a bona fide 
school, museum or public library, or was act-
ing in the course of his employment as an em-
ployee of such organization or of a retail out-
let affiliated with and serving the educational 
purpose of such organization; or 
(3) That the defendant was charged with the 
sale, showing, exhibition or display of an item, 
those portions of which might otherwise be 
contraband forming merely an incidental part 
of an otherwise nonoffending whole, and serv-
ing some legitimate purpose therein other than 
titillation. 
(4) That the defendant had reasonable cause 
to believe that the person involved was not a 
minor." 
§ 167.095 "In any prosecution for violation 
of ORS 167.090, it shall be an affirmative de-
fense for the defendant to prove: 
(1) That the public display, even though in 
connection with a commercial venture, was pri-
marily for artistic purposes or as a public serv-
ice; or 
(2) That the public display was of nudity, 
exhibited by a bona fide art, antique, or similar 
gallery or exhibition, and visible in a normal 
display setting." 
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Not to be forgotten, according to the reasoning of 
the three judge court in Gordon, supra, is that the "ser-
ious literary, etc, value" test would have to be read into 
Utah's statute by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. 
C. Utah's Statute Is Not Rendered Void By 
Article Z, Section 15 Of The Utah Consti-
tution. 
Appellants nakedly assert that the Utah Statute vio-
lates Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution, which 
reads: 
"No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain 
the freedom of speech. . . ." 
They cite no authority for relying on the Utah Consti-
tution independently of the First Amendment. Research 
discloses no authority for the proposition that Article I, 
Section 15 affords protection to a greater scope of activi-
ties than the First Amendment.* Indeed, this court in 
State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 546, 175 P. 2d 725 (1946), 
quoted with approval from Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 
652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 630 the following: 
"That a State in the exercise of its police 
power may punish those who abuse this free-
dom by utterances inimical to the public wel-
fare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite 
*The First Amendment has been repeatedly held to apply to 
the states by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is felt un-
necessary herein to advance the thesis as to the Fourteenth 
Amendment set forth in Dyett v. Turner, 20 Ut. 2d 403. 
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to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not 
open to question." 
This court is free to, and should follow Roth in holding 
tihait pornography, having no social value, is not speech 
and therefore is entitled to no constitutional protection 
by virtue of Article I, Section 15. Further, this court 
should isolate pornography from constitutionally pro-
tected speech in a way no less encroaching upon the 
rights of society in the quality of life and to prevent crim-
inal behavior* than was done in Miller. 
D. This Court Should Affirm The Decisions Of 
The Two Lower Courts. 
The trial court in the case at hand had little diffi-
culty in affirming the constitutionality of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1203 (Supp. 1973). The Court held that 
the requisite specificity could be supplied by authoritative 
construction as suggested by Miller (R-15). "Nudity" 
and "sex" were said to be defined by Utah Code Ann. 
*The rationale of the United States Supreme Court was 
enunciated in one of the six companion cases to Miller as follows: 
". . . we hold that there are legitimate state interests at 
stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity . . . 
These include the interest of the public in the quality of life 
and total community environment, the tone of commerce in 
the great city centers, and, possibly the public safety itself. 
The Hill-Link Minority Keport of the Commission on Obscen-
ity and Pornography indicates that there is at least an 
arguable correlation between obscene material and crime." 
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 
2635 (1973). 
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§ 1202 (Supp. 1973). Thus there was no question, but 
that the publications in the case at hand Pole and Hole, 
Climax, and Love Thirsty, fell within the aforenimtioned 
definitions. 
When the action was appealed to the Second District 
Court, Weber County, the Court held (R-49) that the 
obscenity statute satisfied constitutional standards as fol-
lows: 
"Under Miller, and related decisions, State 
Courts have not only the power but the duty to 
construe State pornography legislation and so 
to construe it as to avoid a constitutional con-
frontation if at all possible. The terms "sex", 
"nudity", and "excretion" have common mean-
ing and understanding in the English Lan-
guage and give notice to all who understand 
that language. If a more specific definition may 
be helpful or necessary such specificity can be 
supplied by judicial construction as per Miller 
and such construction need not precede prose-
cution as long as the original statute is not so 
overboard or vague as not to be understand-
able. . . . 
The Court therefore holds the statute con-
stitutional. . . ." 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should authoritatively construe the wrods 
"nudity and sex" according to their commonly under-
stood meanings, as has been done in New York, Oali-
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fornia, Virginia, Georgia and Kentucky (see cases nos. 
(1) through (5), above) so as to proscribe the hard-core 
pornography defined by Miller and involved in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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